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In Phaedrus 228a5-6, Socrates recollects what Phaedrus has just said about his meeting with 
Lysias. In this passage, 228b5 εἰ μὴ πάνυ τι ἦν μακρός is traditionally read as an independent 
sentence, saying that Phaedrus is able to learn by heart a discourse unless it is not a bit too long. 
So read it would make Socrates behave in a rude way, as he gratuitously reminds us that 
Phaedrus’ ability to retain discourses is pretty limited. But when εἰ μή is governed by a 
swearing such as 228b4 νὴ τὸν κύνα, it has emphatic force, meaning, in this case, that Lysias’ 
discourse was in fact a bit too long. When the sentence is read according to this syntactical 
device, Socrates is not at all rude towards his friend Phaedrus; he is just teasing him and 
mocking rhetorical techniques in passing.
1
  
 
 
 Phaedrus is the first guest to deliver a speech in praise of Eros in the Symposium, 
following Eryximachus’ proposal to spend the evening making encomia to Eros as a 
most convenient way of commemorating Agathon’s first victory in the Athenian tragic 
contest. Five other guests will follow in a row: Pausanias, Aristophanes, Eryximachus, 
Agathon, and to conclude the series, Socrates himself, the order being inverted only 
between Aristophanes and Eryximachus due to the former’s hiccups. The banquet is an 
event, for sure, a philosophical moment, a much more important fictional meeting than 
merely having a bunch of guys getting together to drink, however comical drunk people 
might become. Socrates’ report of Diotima’s speech will have a definite impact on our 
culture, will inspire many poets, will give the main guidelines for the way we think of 
love, and will mark for ever our romantic expectations. 
Phaedrus’ praise is certainly not a brilliant speech, but it serves as the kick-off 
for this momentous gathering in the house of Agathon. His speech is pretty traditional, 
as it is concerned with mythology and genealogy. It begins by describing Eros’s birth, 
                                                          
1
 This paper first appeared in a Festschrift to Raúl Gutierrez, published in a private edition: 
Bernhard Uhde and Miguel Giusti (eds.), Symposion. Festschrift zu Ehren des 60. Geburtstages 
von Raúl Gutiérrez, Freiburg 2015, pp. 175-184. I thank the editors for the permission to reprint 
it here.  
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taken to be one of the ancestral gods, eldest of all of them except Chaos. More reference 
to myths will come, as in the handling of the myth of Orpheus. But we also get 
considerations about the influence of love on human life. Love is indeed very useful for 
us as a society, and not only for the couples themselves, for, as the lover struggles to 
appear beautiful to the beloved, he strives for beautiful and right actions, and so love 
induces us to live beautifully or nobly, that is, living kalôs, forcing us to adopt the moral 
pattern of life. And it makes us adopt the moral way of living up to the point of 
sacrificing our own lives for the beloved, as exemplified for instance by Alcestis. 
Letting oneself die to benefit the beloved is a supreme mark of altruism, and altruism is 
the characteristic trait of morality: nobility and morality go hand in hand, as they are 
induced by love. Love bonds people together, making of them an invincible army. At 
the same time, the lover is ashamed to do mean things in the presence of the beloved, 
which is very convenient for mankind, and goes also in the direction of morality. 
Nothing too enthralling, but nothing to be ashamed of either. A praise not 
without merit, but poor in substance, according to the judgment of Bury
2
, and so in 
many other commentators as well.
3
 Maybe; but Phaedrus points right from the start to 
an essential tension within love: the lover wants to get satisfied by the beloved, he acts 
thus in strict regard to his own satisfaction, but goes to great pains to benefit the 
beloved, and becomes thereby unselfish. This is not a minor point, even if it comes 
blurred amid a great number of myths and genealogies: it is the human gigantomachia 
painted into a mythological fresco. Other guests will give their praises, and will come 
up with other ideas: love is a quest for a lost unity, a search for immortality, a natural 
instinct, the strength for ascending to beauty, and so. But Phaedrus, despite his 
attachment to the rhetorical techniques that function much more as a straitjacket to his 
ideas than as a useful tool to make them come to the fore, is neither mediocre nor 
uninteresting: he discloses a tension within love, and poetry will regularly build on this 
tension to compose its songs of love. 
But before Phaedrus makes his speech, we get some information about Socrates’ 
character from the prologue. Aristodemus tell us he met Socrates bathed and beautifully 
dressed, with slippers on his feet. This is unusual; Socrates is normally barefoot, and 
                                                          
2
 Bury : xxv, quoted approvingly by Allen 1991 : 12-13. 
3
 Among Brazilian commentators, see Cavalcante de Souza: “ele <Phaedrus> está ‘dando uma 
lição’, atitude perfeitamente conforme com a seriedade do seu espírito medíocre” (1966 : 102). 
For a much more symphatetic appraisal, see Francalanci 2005.  
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dressed with his well-worn cloak. But this time he is going to Agathon’s feast, and 
should not be underdressed. Socrates then convinces Aristodemus to go together with 
him; only Socrates was invited to the banquet, but he is sure there will be no problem in 
bringing along a friend, even if he has not been previously invited. Old good times! 
However, as they approach Agathon’s house, Aristodemus has to knock the door and 
come in alone, for Socrates stayed behind. This is a bit embarrassing. Socrates, caught 
by a thought, withdrew to a porch next door and remained there motionless; the servants 
had to keep calling him to join the other guests for dinner. This is typical of him. When 
Alcibiades storms into that calm gathering, drunk, supported by a flute-girl, crowned 
with ivy and violets, he dramatically changes the atmosphere. In his speech, this time in 
praise of Socrates himself, he remembers that once, when they were together on the 
campaign to Potidaea, Socrates began to pursue a thought he had at dawn, and stood in 
the same spot motionless considering that idea for the whole day; the next dawn, he 
offered a prayer to the rising sun, and finally moved (220c-d). And Socrates is not only 
strong on pursuing ideas. He is also moderate, as he rejects Alcibiades’ offer as a lover 
(216c-219d)
4
, stays outside in winter-time barely dressed (220b), and never gets drunk 
(214a). In Delium, Alcibiades goes on to say, Socrates proved also to be really 
courageous and brave, not fearing death to help Alcibiades when the army was 
retreating in a disordered fashion (221a-b). Alcibiades concludes, drawing on the 
comparison to the Silenus statues, which contained other statues inside when you break 
them (215b), that when you look inside Socrates, you will find these marvellous statues, 
all these divine discourses with which he enchants everyone: he is wise, actually the 
wisest man Alcibiades ever met. There is no explicit mention or hint that Socrates is 
also just, but justice surely is one more virtue Socrates has, since he is fair to everybody. 
Being the wisest person in world, how could he not be just? Perhaps Alcibiades averts 
any talk about justice deliberately, not because of Socrates, but because of himself: this 
is a topic that would make him have hiccups, as Aristophanes had in the Symposium. To 
sum up: Socrates has the four cardinal virtues Plato has so much argued for in many of 
his dialogues. 
                                                          
4
 To appreciate Socrates’ moderation in relation to Alcibiades’ attempts to seduce him, “most of 
us need to translate it into heterosexual terms and imagine Socrates as a healthy man who 
converses tranquilly, and then falls soundly asleep, when a beautiful girl has crept naked under 
his blanket and put her arms round him” (Dover 1980 : 164-5). 
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Plato’s Socrates is thus brave, moderate, just, and, of course, wise, despite being 
keen on declaring that the only thing he knows is that he knows nothing. The latter is 
the so famous Socratic irony, much resented by his adversaries as sheer pretence. But 
Socrates is also, as we shall see, ironic in the modern sense of responding in a jocular 
mood, making puns, and deriding even himself. But making fun of somebody may go 
too far, and one may become rather rude to a friend or to someone who does not deserve 
to be treated in such a contemptuous fashion. Does Socrates ever become tactless when 
making fun of someone? As a matter of fact, one may think that he can even be 
deliberately rude to someone who treats him as a friend.  
Plato casts Phaedrus also in the Phaedrus, a dialogue which is named after him 
and in which he has a much more developed role than he had in the Symposium, in 
which he delivers the first speech in praise of love. Phaedrus is depicted in both 
dialogues as being passionate about sophistry and rhetoric. He is also mentioned in the 
Protagoras, where he is among the audience of Hippias. Phaedrus is fond of literature 
and an admirer of Lysias; in the Phaedrus, he attended to his speech on love, and is 
eager to discuss it with whomever crosses his way. In this speech, Lysias attempted to 
show that one should grant one’s favours to a man who is not in love rather than to one 
who is – the theme, or at least one of the topics the dialogue deals with, is love again, as 
it was in the Symposium. There Phaedrus was a young man; here, he is a mature man. 
The speech is given in the early hours of the morning, as is typical in Athens for a class. 
It took place at Epicrates’ house. Phaedrus remained seated there listening for a good 
moment, asked him a good deal of questions, which Lysias readily answered. Having 
got the written version of the speech, Phaedrus read it again and again, focusing on the 
main ideas put forward in it. At some point round noon, he goes for a walk outside the 
walls to stretch his legs, when he bumps into Socrates. Both then search for an idyllic 
place in the middle of a hot summer’s day to discuss the core of Lysias’ speech. The 
scene is thus set: under a very tall plane-tree along the Ilissus, they sit on the grass as 
they hear the song of the cicadas, and Phaedrus reads the speech to Socrates. 
But not everything is so idyllic. Socrates has already indulged in mockery, as he 
remarks that, if one should grant one’s favour to one who is not in love, perhaps Lysias 
will also go as far as to say that it should also be to a poor man rather than a rich one, or 
to an older rather than a younger man: that would be quite urbane, and Socrates can at 
last hope to be an appropriate candidate! But more is to come. Having heard from 
Phaedrus that he spent a long time sitting in Epicrates’ house, since sunrise to be 
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precise, involved all this time in listening and hearing things about love from Lysias, he 
asks Phaedrus to tell him about what has been discussed. As Phaedrus says in false 
modesty that he would not be able to repeat what the “cleverest of present writers” 
(228a1-2) has said over such a long period of time, Socrates promptly retorts:  
Soc.: Phaedrus – if I don’t know Phaedrus, I’ve even forgotten who I am. But I do, and I 
haven’t; I know perfectly well that when he heard Lysias’ speech he did not hear it just 
once, but repeatedly asked him to go through it for him, and Lysias responded readily. 
But for Phaedrus not even that was enough, and in the end he borrowed the book and 
examined the things in it which he was most eager to look at, and doing this he sat from 
sun-up, until he was tired and went for a walk, unless I am much mistaken actually 
knowing the speech quite off by heart, unless it was rather a long one; and he was going 
outside the wall to practise it. (228a5-b6) 
 This is Rowe’s translation5, which, despite minor differences, is representative 
of the way the passage is read. Socrates reports what Phaedrus has just said to him. Why 
does he do that, given that there is no philosophical point worth repeating, and Phaedrus 
has said all this just a moment ago? Well, one may say, Socrates repeats the content, but 
the style is not the same: it is now couched as a plea in the law-court. In this way we 
begin to be habituated to rhetoric and its techniques. More than this: it is a parody of the 
techniques later attributed to Tisias (273a6-274a6): we are already seeing them at work. 
This is true. But Socrates is also highlighting that Phaedrus is pretending: he is most 
eager to say aloud Lysias’ speech again6, and is able, or thinks he is able to do this word 
for word straightaway, but pretends that he will only be able to run through the purport 
of what Lysias said and give a summary of each topic in turn, but not to rend the speech 
word for word (228d1-5). Socrates thwarts the trick as his attention is directed to 
something Phaedrus carries in his left hand under the cloak: it is the written speech 
itself. In fact Phaedrus wanted to make Socrates his sparring partner as he sets out to 
deliver the whole speech he has just learnt by heart; instead, because Socrates rightly 
suspected Phaedrus had the book, they sit on the grass to read the speech aloud, and 
discuss its content. One may then say that reading a book instead of saying aloud the 
speech paves the way for the dialogue’s concluding remarks on the advantages and 
                                                          
5
 Rowe 1986 : 23.  
6
 See 228c2 ἐθρύπτετο ὡς δὴ οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶν λέγειν: having met Socrates, the greatest lover of 
discourses he could ever meet, “he feigned coyness, as if he did not yearn to speak”. The verb 
thruptô means here “‘to refuse what one (really) desires’, ‘to pose’, especially in lovers’ 
language” (de Vries 1969 : 41-42). 
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disadvantages of written texts when compared to lively discussions
7
, but at this juncture 
the hiding and disclosure of the book is just a device to underline not only Phaedrus’ 
deep attachment to Lysias’ rhetorical tactics, but also, and more specifically, his 
eagerness to show off his own abilities in this field.
8
 
 Socrates is thus not fooled by Phaedrus, but would Socrates become rude just 
because of such a childish trick? He would, at least according to modern translations, 
for he lets us know that Phaedrus can learn by heart only small chunks, but certainly not 
a large speech. This is a rude remark, especially because Phaedrus has treated him as a 
friend all along, and deserves no such reproach. Perhaps this is how Phaedrus is? We do 
not know, and there is nowhere any hint in this direction, besides being unlikely. 
Anyhow, how inelegant would be to remind him of this shortcoming right at this 
moment. Actually, I do not think Plato makes Socrates lose his temper because of such 
a childish trick. Phaedrus may look a bit ingenuous, but Socrates need not be rude, or 
inelegant. Phaedrus is only one more would-be thinker enchanted with sophistry, 
another orator charmed by rhetoric, but, in spite of his intellectual weakness and 
shortcomings, he is a genuine lover of speeches, including Socratic ones: they are all 
logoi, and he is fond of any logos. As a matter of fact, Socrates is not rude to him, quite 
the contrary, or so I will argue: he is just teasing him, and mocking the rhetorical 
techniques in passing. It is the modern translations that make him observe that Phaedrus 
would have learnt the speech by heart only if it was a small chunk, as if he were rude or 
inelegant. Phaedrus may have intellectual problems in grasping the philosophical import 
of a point, but he does not seem to have any problem with his memory – or does he? 
Apparently he does, according to modern translations: Phaedrus will know the 
speech quite off by heart, unless it is rather a long one. The Greek phrase is 
this: εἰ μὴ πάνυ τι ἦν μακρός (228b5). The manuscripts give tis instead of ti, but ti is 
Schanz’ emendation now backed up by a papyrus (Oxyr. 1016). Both readings are 
possible, as de Vries remarks: tis would give a light accentuation to the quality denoted 
by the adjective, and ti does the same, as panu goes closely with makros: both come to 
                                                          
7
 As a sort of anticipation of the opposition between memory and writing to be discussed at the 
end of the dialogue: see for instance Santa Cruz & Crespo 2007 : 50. 
8
 Otherwise, taking Phaedrus’ words at face value, one should say that “no doubt it was 
customary for rhetorical teachers to encourage their pupils to make such summaries, and it is 
enough for Phaedrus to complain that Socrates, by detecting the manuscript, has cheated him of 
an opportunity for doing so” (Hackforth 1952 : 26). But Phaedrus is no longer a young pupil, 
and is depicted in too strong a turmoil and excitement to be willing only to produce summaries. 
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the same upshot, “unless it is a bit too long”.9 So Phaedrus has problems with his 
memory. But he doesn’t: he was about to recite the entire speech by heart, had Socrates 
not cheated him of an opportunity to show off his rhetorical abilities by pointing to the 
book he was hiding under the cloak.   
Let us revisit the whole sentence before accusing Socrates of being impolite 
towards his companion: 
228b2-5: καὶ τοῦτο δρῶν ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ καθήμενος ἀπειπὼν εἰς περίπατον ᾔει, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ 
οἶμαι, νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἐξεπιστάμενος τὸν λόγον, εἰ μὴ πάνυ τι ἦν μακρός.  
As Phaedrus did all this (touto with a collective sense: listening to Lysias, asking 
him questions, reading the book over and over) remaining seated since the sunrise, he 
got tired at some point (near noon) and so went out for a walk. This much is pretty 
clear. Now comes the incriminated sentence: ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, νὴ τὸν κύνα, 
ἐξεπιστάμενος τὸν λόγον, εἰ μὴ πάνυ τι ἦν μακρός. He went out doubtless (as I guess or 
as I believe: ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι) knowing the speech off by heart (ἐξεπιστάμενος τὸν 
λόγον). The verb exepistamai means exactly this: to know thoroughly, the prefix ek 
accentuating that you made it through all the steps, you do know it by heart. But in-
between there is the oath νὴ τὸν κύνα. Here is what Dodds says about it: 
A playful allusion to the dog-headed god Anubis. (...) The tendency to distort nomina 
sacra in swearing is evident in many languages (cf. ‘by gum’, ‘bedad’, ‘parbleu’, etc.). 
This particular distortion, though a favourite with Socrates, was not peculiar to him. (...) 
Socrates can hardly have adopted it ‘out of aversion to any light handling even of the 
Greek divinities’ (Lodge), since he quite often swears frankly by Zeus, Hera, and other 
deities. And I can find no basis for Burnet’s suggestion (on Apol. 22a1) that it may be 
‘Orphic’.10  
What the heck is it then doing here? That Socrates shuns swearing by Greek 
deities is ruled out, as Dodds remarked.
11
 As a matter of fact, “by Zeus” is a very 
common swearing in Plato’s time, and Plato makes Socrates use it quite often. Maybe it 
“contributes to Socrates’ bantering tone”, as Yunis says?12 That may be possible, if we 
take it to add something to the meaning of the whole sentence. But in this case, Socrates 
                                                          
9
 Nehamas & Woodruff’s solution (“unless it was extraordinarily long”) looks like a 
compromise: his memory fails because it was extraordinarily long, but wouldn’t fail if it was 
only a bit too long.  
10
 Dodds 1959 : 262-3. 
11
 Though still vindicated: “c’est un euphémisme permettant d’éviter un nê tòn Día ‘par Zeus’” 
(Brisson 2004 : 193). 
12
 Yunis 2011 : 89. 
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behaves in an impolite fashion towards Phaedrus, who behaves in turn in a friendly way 
towards him. 
Perhaps then the swearing adds nothing to the picture in what regards its content, 
but has a syntactical role? I think it does. Aristophanes can help us understand this 
syntactical role, as it is (deliberately) blurred in this rhetorical summary of Phaedrus’ 
intentions. The nê or ma swearing is typical Attic, and is quite common in Plato and 
Aristophanes. Actually there is a great deal of it in Aristophanes. Here are two passages 
from his comedies which are very helpful to us in my view. In the Thesmophoriazusae, 
when Mnesilochus is dressed as Helen, and Euripides is disguised as Menelaus, Critylla, 
who has just appeared in stage, keeps watch on Mnesilochus-Helen. Euripides, as he 
enters the stage, asks him who is this girl who keeps an eye on him. As Mnesilochus 
pretends that she is Theonoë, Proteus’ daughter, in line with their imagined characters, 
she retorts immediately that her name is Critylla. Here is her reply in Greek: 
vv. 897-899 μὰ τὼ θεώ,  
εἰ μὴ Κρίτυλλά γ’ Ἀντιθέου Γαργηττόθεν·  
σὺ δ’ εἶ πανοῦργος. 
The translation is something like this: “By the twain goddesses if I am not 
Critylla, the daughter of Antitheus, of the deme of Gargettus; and you are a rogue”. The 
two goddesses are Demeter and Persephone, in whose temple they are, and to whom the 
Thesmophoria are celebrated; the rogue is Mnesilochus. The meaning is clear: Critylla 
has no delusions about herself, she knows very well who she is. The negation in the ei 
mê clause is expletive as the sentence is not to be taken alone, but governed by the ma-
swearing: “I am Critylla, by the two goddesses!”13  
 Here is another passage from Aristophanes. Right at the beginning of the 
Knights, after Demosthenes and Nicias had read the oracle Paphlagon was keeping in 
secret, Demosthenes tries to convince a sausage-seller, who happens to be at the market, 
that he should be the overlord to all the people, the Agora, the Harbours, and the Pnix, 
so that the oracle would be fulfilled and they could get rid of Paphlagon. The sausage-
seller is astonished, as he wants merely to sell his sausages, and has no delusions about 
himself. In his own defence, he says he is surely not worthy of so great a power; 
                                                          
13
 Austin and Olson (2004 : 287) comment that ei mê Kritulla g’ literally is “unless I am 
Kritylla”, but it here means that “I am Kritylla!” They are right, the phrase does mean “of 
course I am Kritylla”, but precisely because it is governed by the preceding swearing, and as 
such is not to be understood literally, that is, independently. 
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Demosthenes, always trying to persuade him, reacts asking him if he is not a gentleman, 
a kalos kagathos. The question is introduced by môn, which normally is followed by a 
negative answer, but it can sometimes suggest an affirmative answer, as it clearly does 
here. Demosthenes wants him to have higher expectations, to fall prey to dreams of 
power and grandeur. But the sausage-seller sticks to reality and replies quite simply that 
he does belong to the vulgar, he is not a gentleman: 
vv. 185-186  μὰ τοὺς θεούς,  
εἰ μὴ ’κ πονηρῶν γ’. 
We have again the ei mê sentence governed by a ma swearing: “by the gods if I 
am not a base man”, meaning that he obviously belongs to the mean people, he is a 
vulgar sausage-seller and not a kalos kagathos, as Demosthenes was feigning that he 
was. This is not sophisticated language, it is a colloquial expression sausage-sellers 
employ commonly. 
Let us pause and take stock. The lesson seems to be this: when governed by a 
swearing phrase, and notably in Attic by a swearing constructed with nê or ma <tous 
theous>, the ei mê sentence that follows should be taken not in the restrictive sense of 
unless, but in the reverse sense, as a way of accentuating the affirmative force of the 
clause: of course I belong to the base people, of course I am Critylla, there is no 
quarrelling about it.
14
 And, to come back to our text, Phaedrus, when tired, goes out to 
stretch his legs, knowing the text by heart – and by the dog if it is not a bit long, 
meaning that it surely is a bit too long, as is always the case in rhetorical pieces, since 
orators are fond of makroi logoi, long speeches, and Lysias surely indulges in such a 
practice. As a matter of fact, Socrates is not saying that Phaedrus will only learn a text 
by heart if it is not too long; he knows very well that Phaedrus learns his texts by heart, 
however long they are, and he also knows pretty well that rhetorical pieces tend to be a 
bit long, to put it mildly. The icing on the cake is that, as he couches his own speech in a 
rhetorical fashion, Socrates slightly displaces the swearing from the clause it governs, 
                                                          
14
 The expression ‘swearing + ei mê’ is thus a colloquial expression in Attic. There are plenty of 
cases however in which the swearing precedes a sentence, but does not govern it; see for 
instance Protagoras 312e4-5 Μὰ Δί’, ἔφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν, where each sentence is to be 
translated separately: “For Zeus’ sake, I have no longer an answer to you”. Another example is 
found right at the beginning of Gorgias, said by Polus: 448a5 Νὴ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ 
Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ. There is also a great deal of these constructions in Aristophanes’ comedies, in 
which the swearing does not govern the following phrase; but when it is so governed in the 
‘swearing + ei mê’ construction, the sense of ei mê changes dramatically, from “unless x” to “of 
course x”. 
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creating in this way an expectation of higher style and deepness, only to render the 
interpretation vague. Here is the translation I propose for the passage we have been 
examining, slightly changing Rowe’s proposal: 
Soc.: Phaedrus – if I don’t know Phaedrus, I’ve even forgotten who I am. But I do, and I 
haven’t; I know perfectly well that when he heard Lysias’ speech he did not hear it just 
once, but repeatedly asked him to go through it for him, and Lysias responded readily. 
But for Phaedrus not even that was enough, and in the end he borrowed the book and 
examined the things in it which he was most eager to look at, and doing all this seated 
right from sunrise, when he got tired he went for a walk, knowing – I am sure – the 
speech quite off by heart – and by the dog if it is not a bit too long! And there he was 
strolling outside the wall to practise it. (228a5-b6) 
 So read, Socrates is not only moderate, courageous, just, and wise – he is also 
polite, not being in the least offensive towards Phaedrus who has been so friendly 
towards him. But, of course, Socrates loses no opportunity to make fun of rhetorical 
techniques and likings. He does not want to concede rhetoric any prize, even if it means 
to momentarily seem rude to Phaedrus due to a syntactical vagueness caused by these 
very syntactical techniques when applied to an otherwise unproblematic colloquial 
expression. This is one of the lessons Phaedrus will learn as the discussion unfolds 
under a tall plane-tree in the middle of a summer hot day. 
 
 
Marco Zingano 
Universidade de São Paulo 
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